see also
Salafis and the ‘Arab Spring’ in Yemen: Progressive Politicization and Resilient Quietism
Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity
Salafis have done more than stepped in to fill a void, they have moved to the frontlines and stepped up to leadership positions with sufficient funding and armament missing in late 2013. All factions have a grudge against Houthis, some against Saleh, all against Hadi. Their resources and funding was delivered through personal contacts, not through the Legitimate Government in exile. Just as recruits have been mobilized from small mosques and religious centers through personal relations, so to are funds and weapons. Their effectiveness does not surface from their cohesiveness, but rather from a common goal.
There is no doubt Salafis have played a vital role in turning this conflict into a sectarian battle. It is a natural course of events when the government is unable to mobilized a professional army in an armed conflict and instead participates in a war with two religious adversaries. Houthis see Salafis, along with the Muslim brotherhood, as terrorists, part of al-Qaeda’s global network. While Salafis, and the Muslim Brotherhood see Shia Zaydi Houthis as apostates, utilizing Takfeeri tactics. This is also part of the rally cries from patrons supporting Salafi elements beyond Yemen’s borders. The sectarian angle is vital to both sides in order to obscure the political roots of the conflict, a repositioning of centers of power to shape, direct and monopolize Yemen’s future. It is vital for recruitment of foot soldiers, for legitimizing their own struggle globally, and for activating patrons. Politics are divisive, as the current conflict illustrates, but religious narratives unify.
The rise of Salafis at the forefront of the ongoing conflict, even as caretakers, also lies beyond the need for a dedicated, focused, driven force. Salafis are unlikely heroes, with minimal grassroots support, whose ‘conservative’ doctrine is foreign to Yemeni culture. Coalition hegemons know this and exploit it to ensure they can monopolize the direction of Yemen’s future. President Hadi has been denied every opportunity to take credit for any victory since April 2015, and the method in which the Coalition monopolizes humanitarian aid delivery, taking the lead and only allowing local or provincial government officials a photo-op, are clear evidence of the intentional marginalization of the Legitimate Government in exile.
Factions and leaders
Between April 2015 and June 2016 the conflict map constantly fluctuated. While southern provinces have essentially been cleared of Houthi rebels and Saleh loyalists since early March 2016, the remaining of the country from al-Baydha north, west and east is either in conflict with Houthis and Saleh or under their ‘control’. The south experiences a low intensity tug-o-war among Secessionist factions and with Salafi elements throughout. In the northern regions of Baydha, Ibb, Mareb and Taiz Salafis sustain an extensive presence and a strong role in governance leading the resistance efforts. Only Dhamar presents an unique situation, where Houthis and Salafis singed an interesting agreement for coexistence.
Salafist factions playing major roles against Houthis and Saleh are elements from Dar al-Hadith (Aden, Fayush, Ibb, Mareb, Shebwa,Taiz), Abu al-Sadduq, Hikma Foundation network, Abdullah al-Ahdal (Taqaweh Charity) and Saroories, as well as al-Rashad Party. Each faction not only oversees a sphere of influence within Yemen, but is also part of a sphere of patronage, either from Saudi Arabia or the UAE, who lead the Arab Coalition since March 2015. Alliances exist, as both natural to the environment where factions operate or as result of patronage. As a meeting sponsored by the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Guidance in late August 2016 illustrated, Muslim Brotherhood officials (Islah) like Mohammed al-Yadoumi, Abdul-Wahhab al-Homayqani of al-Rashad, Abdullah al-Ahdal, an associate of Ahmed Hussain al-Mualim (chairman of Hikma Foundation) and AQAP affiliates like Awad Ba NaNajar and Ghalib Ba Qayti, and others came together to sign a Charter, a pact among these factions for cooperation on the ground in Yemen. This meeting and the pact were immediately rejected by shaykh Hani Bin Briek in Aden, keeping in mind the Aden official falls within the UAE sphere of influence, Bin Briek is said to have led the latest raids against Ansar al-Sharia and AQAP cells in Aden with UAE support.
The central region of Yemen is not only a construct put forth by militants, the geography illustrates clear transit routes and unique political history. Surrounded by seven provinces, al-Baydha stands at the crossroads of north and south Yemen, used by a number of actors as a base. Aside from the deeply rooted alliance with al-Qaeda (AQ) maintained by al-Dhahab family, tribes in this province have a long history of interaction with religious currents influencing Yemen, from Zaydi Islam to Wahhabism. Conflict in the region as consequence, such as clashes between Houthis and Salafis (including Ansar al-Sharia/AAS), are not new nor are beyond the sectarian narrative.
People in al-Baydha have been loyal to Zaydi Imams, as well as exposed to Wahhabi Islam during the 1970s oil boom. The province is claimed by North Yemen, its leaders claim it is not part of the north, while southerners from al-Dhale to Abyan reject it as part of South Arabia. It is a disputed territory that lends itself to a game of turf wars. Limited central government control led to Houthis increasing their armed presence throughout the province in 2013 as AQAP affiliates expanded their relations with local tribes. As leaders from Bayt al-Dhahab were charged with cementing alliances between local tribes and Ansar al-Sharia under Hatem Abdulhamid Ma’moon, Houthis perceived a growing threat to both the local Zaydi population and the Central Region at large. Hatem saw al-Baydha as the perfect launching pad for his own grand plans for Ansar al-Sharia, which included a march to his home province of Ibb as an expansion of AAS affiliate emirates.
Current divisions in al-Baydha are the product of a clear series of events. The uprising of 2011 helped create a number of new organizations, al-Rashad was one of those new political organizations. The party itself cannot be viewed simply as the politicization of Salafism or the fracturing of Islah. It was the rise of a Salafist faction from the ashes to the political scene, lifting al-Baydha to the center of regional politics. Many will claim, with substantial evidence, that al-Rashad manifests the rise of al-Qaeda as a political entity, with sufficient funding and a cohesive leadership core. Houthi leaders recognized the significance of this new political party, legitimizing the political role of a dormant religious actor, which not only directly threatened Zaydi Muslims but also joined the National Dialogue with its own delegation.
Just as many of Saleh’s close confidents come from al-Baydha’s tribes, so do people close to Ali Muhsin, high ranking members of Islah and the founders of al-Rashad party. Hadi’s current political advisor & member of the government’s negotiating committee for peace talks Abdul-Wahhab al-Homaiqani, a US designated terrorist, hails from al-Baydha as does Mohammed Moussa al’Amari, president of al-Rashad, and shaykh Ali Abdu Rabbo al-Awadhi (see Analysis section here). The current governor of al-Baydha, Nayif Saleh Salem al-Qaysi is also part of al-Rashad, he’s also a US designated terrorist as of May 2016.
Clear evidence provided by terrorist designations of high ranking officials and overt relations between tribal families and AQAP/AAS illustrates how easily the lines blur on the ground beyond headlines and apologetic narratives. Such realities sufficiently validated Houthi narratives (aimed at both local and international audiences) describing a war against terrorists and added to the sectarian narrative presented by both sides, the fight against apostates and the war against Takferees. This conflict played out most vividly through social media platforms, Twitter and YouTube, where AAS narrated its campaign against Houthis in al-Baydha. Throughout 2014 and 2015 AAS’ Twitter accounts detailed the war with Houthis; operations, casualties and successes in al-Baydha were all part of the campaign to promote AAS online to a wider audience. Daily posts, until accounts were removed one by one, provided in-depth accounts of clashes, it was as if al-Baydha was the model for AAS, which Hatem always used to legitimize his leadership position, even over Emir/Commander Jalal Bila’yd al-Zinjabari al-Maraqashi (d. Feb. 2016), at the local and global level.
There are two reasons why al-Baydha is such an important case study. One, nearly six years of continuous armed conflict in the province illustrates how AQAP has been able to main semi-permanent presence in a single battle front, unchallenged by government troops, with help from local elements that don’t necessarily share its global agenda. Two, in a broader context, al-Baydha provides a limited model for what to expect from a governance system with weak central authority, not the Saleh era, but rather thinking of the Federal system proposed by president Hadi as an NDC outcome. In the first instance, the conflict in al-Baydha has remained at an extremely tense level, constant reinforcements to sustain the fight against Houthis, even as both Hatem and Bilay’d were removed from the leadership. AAS is no longer conducting suicide operations against Houthi elements today as it did in 2014 or 2015, nor is AAS mobilizing militants from outside al-Baydha to the war front. But Salafi leaders, with strong networks nationwide are resupplying fighters to join local tribesmen against Houthis on various fronts in al-Baydha. Sources indicate clashes have diminished somewhat in recent months, but no party has declared victory to date.
Salafis in other provinces will undoubtedly use al-Baydha as a model for future political engagement. We are yet to see the rise of a new Salafi political party elsewhere, but as events develop in Aden and Hadhramawt, it is likely a new party will emerge. Some may think Taiz will follow al-Baydha’s path, but it is unclear which Salafist faction could take that path in coming months. Aden remains predictably under Hirak’s sphere at the moment, and it is unlikely Hani Bin Briek can move against al-Dhale’s Hirak, even with support from the UAE.
Diwan 
Comments are closed.